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As an explanatory principle in biology, 
vitalism has long been in decline, as 
one discovery after another revealed 
that mechanisms provide convincing 
explanations—hearts are pumps, genes 
are code—for all manner of life’s 
phenomena. But even through the 20th 
century, the mind has been vitalism’s 
last redoubt, because there has been 
no simple, satisfactory, mechanistic 
explanation of the most puzzling aspect 
of the mind: the nature of conscious 
awareness. For many years, even asking 
questions about the inner workings of 
this mental black box was taboo among 
some groups of scientists.
But that has all changed. A flood 
of new discoveries in every area of 
neuroscience has led to competing 
models of consciousness, and most 
importantly, testable hypotheses. 
A new study by Raphael Gaillard, 
Lionel Naccache, and colleagues 
provides support for one such model 
by showing that conscious, but not 
nonconscious, visual information is 
rapidly and widely distributed across 
the brain, provoking the synchronized 
brain activity that is the hallmark of 
conscious processing. 
The model, called the “global 
workspace” model, posits that incoming 
information becomes conscious only 
when three conditions are met. First, 
the information must be represented 
by networks of sensory neurons, such 
as those in the primary visual cortex 
at the rear of the brain, that process 
incoming visual signals. Second, 
this representation must last long 
enough to gain access to (“come to 
the attention of”) a second stage of 
processing, distributed across the 
brain’s cortex, and especially involving 
the prefrontal cortex, which is believed 
to be a major center for associating 
multiple kinds of information. Third 
and finally, this combination of 
bottom-up information propagation 
and top-down amplification through 
attention must “ignite” to create a state 
of reverberating, coherent activity 
among many different brain centers. 
That, according to the model, is what 
we experience as consciousness.
A difficulty of consciousness studies 
is that humans are the best subjects, 
but probing inside their brains purely 
for research purposes is unethical. So 
the authors turned to patients with 
medically intractable epilepsy, who, in 
preparation for surgery, had required 
multiple shallow recording electrodes 
to be implanted within their cerebral 
cortexes to locate seizure activity. 
The authors showed the participants 
a computer screen, upon which they 
projected first a set of hatch marks 
(acting as a meaningless “mask”), then 
a word, and then either a blank screen 
or a set of ampersands (another mask). 
The entire sequence took only half a 
second, and the word was flashed so 
briefly that in neither case could the 
participant name the word. But in 
both cases the word was registered at 
the earliest stages of visual processing 
nonetheless, as shown by electrical 
activity in the primary visual cortex, 
thus meeting the first condition of the 
global workspace model.
The words themselves were either 
of a threatening (“kill,” “danger”) 
or nonthreatening (“cousin,” “see”) 
nature. When participants were 
exposed to words followed by the 
second mask, they could guess the 
nature of the words they saw with no 
better than chance frequency. The 
second stage was not reached; the fire 
was doused before it could ignite.
But when the second mask was 
absent, the words were consciously 
reportable and readable, so the authors 
could compare masked (nonconscious) 
perception and unmasked (conscious) 
perception of briefly flashed words.
The electrodes told the same story. 
There were sustained voltage changes 
throughout the brain, especially in the 
prefrontal cortex. The voltage changes 
were accompanied by an increase 
in power within specific brain wave 
frequencies associated with cognitive 
processing, as well as synchronization 
of activity among many different brain 
regions—in short, the brain gave every 
appearance of thinking about the word. 
In the language of the global workspace 
model, the stimulus endured long 
enough, and gained enough attention, to 
be promoted to the workspace, at which 
point information about it was broadcast 
throughout the brain to be processed 
in multiple ways—including the 
determination of its emotional character.
The authors point out that 
consciousness is always “about” 
something; there may be no “pure” 
state of consciousness that is 
independent of the content of our 
thought, and so an important question 
is whether these results, concerning 
a single word the participant could 
not even name, are generalizable to 
understanding the ongoing flow of 
our conscious experience. Further 
experiments with other kinds of stimuli 
may reveal which late-stage, widespread 
brain events are common to all 
conscious processing, and which are 
specific to the experiment at hand.
Gaillard R, Dehaene S, Adam C, Clémenceau 
S, Hasboun D, et al. (2009) Converging 
intracranial markers of conscious access. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000061
Copyright: © 2009 Richard Robinson. This is an 
open-access article distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original author and source are credited.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000066.g001
A hallmark of conscious visual perception 
is the sudden increase of communication 
between distant brain areas. Less than 
half a second after a word was flashed 
on a screen, its conscious perception was 
associated with a burst of synchrony within 
a dedicated range of frequencies (red 
spot around 20 Hz). This signature was 
absent during nonconscious perception of 
subliminal words.